RÉSUMÉ: En écrivant sur les Lumières, Hegel n’a pas pris position contre ce mouvement en tant qu’adversaire. S’il s’y est opposé, c’est plutôt pour engager avec lui un dialogue; et il l’a de cette façon transformé. Il n’a pas, en réalité, rejeté ses approches et ses méthodes et il est trompeur de le présenter comme préparant le chemin aux irrationalistes comme Dostoïevski et Nietzsche. Le but de Hegel était plutôt d’éclairer les Lumières sur elles-mêmes, et c’est en cela exactement que (...) consistait son projet à ses propres yeux. Sans prendre parti, il a tenu compte de la foi et de la raison et il a délibérément évité de considérer les Lumières et la foi comme des opposés contradictoires. Son projet en est un de réconciliation. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss aspects of Herbert Leyendecker’s 1913 doctoral dissertation, Towards the Phenomenology of Deceptions, which he defended in 1913 at the University of Munich. Leyendecker was a member of the Munich and Göttingen Phenomenological Circles. In my discussion of his largely neglected views, I explore the connection between his ideas concerning “attitudes”, e.g., of searching for, observing, counting, or working with objects, and the central topic of his text, perceptual illusions, thematized by Leyendecker as a kind of (...) perceptual “deception”. Indeed, Leyendecker argues that a change of attitude is a necessary aspect of an illusion. I argue that Leyendecker’s use of the notion of attitude in accounting for illusions is problematic; yet I also suggest that his ideas are not devoid of philosophical interest, in relation to current debates. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, Alva Noë’s discussions of perceptual presence contain an ambiguity between what I refer to as ‘presence as absence’ (PA) and ‘virtual presence’ (VP). This ambiguity emerges in Noë’s solution to ‘the problem of perceptual presence’, or the problem of how to account for our perceptual experience of that which we ‘strictly speaking’ are not seeing. Second, his account of presence by degrees, i.e. his radical claim that many distant, out-of-view objects are (...) (quasi-perceptually) present to us by various degrees, will not be tenable whether unpacked in terms of PA or VP: e.g. Noë argues that the presence of the tomato in front of him, and the presence of his friend Dominic in a distant country, are different not in kind but in degree only. Neither of the two conceptions of presence renders this plausible. (shrink)

In his book Action in Perception, Alva Noë poses what he refers to as the “problem of perceptual presence” and develops his enactive view as solution to the problem. Noë describes the problem of perceptual presence as the problem of how to conceive of the presence of that which, “strictly speaking,” we do not perceive. I argue that the “problem of perceptual presence” is ambiguous between two problems that need to be addressed by invoking very different resources. On the one (...) hand, there is the problem of how to conceive of the presence of objects as wholes, front side and back, and their constant properties. On the other hand, there is the problem of how to account for the presence of unattended detail. I focus on the first problem, which Noë approaches by invoking Husserlian ideas. I argue that Noë’s enactive view encounters difficulties, which can be dealt with by complementing it with Edmund Husserl’s idea of fulfillment and generally restoring the view to its original Husserlian context. Contrary to Noë’s purport, this involves regarding the view not as a theory of perception and perceptual content but as part of a descriptive–clarificatory project of conceptual analysis. The Husserlian phenomenologist analyzes, e.g., the concept of shape or color by investigating the fulfillment conditions pertinent to shape or color. In general, my critique of Noë’s enactive view serves to caution philosophers against unprincipled uses of Husserlian ideas. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self-justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the intriguing view, recently developed by John Morrison, that there are not just doxastic confidences but also perceptual confidences, i.e., confidences as aspect of perceptual experience, enabling us to account, e.g., for the increasing confidence with which we experience an approaching human figure, while telling ourselves, as the viewing distance diminishes, “It looks like (...) this just could be Isaac”, “It looks like this is probably Isaac”, “It looks like this is almost certainly Isaac”. I first present my Husserlian account with a focus on the notion of fulfillment, and the idea that the contents of perceptual experience are fulfillment conditions. I then show that this account can be complemented by PC. Finally, I develop a focus on the idea of perceptual self-justification, diverting the perceptual confidence debate from its pre-eminent concern with the relations between perceptual and doxastic confidences, and present an argument to the effect that there are perceptual confidences. (shrink)

In a discussion of the constitutive role of colour in our visual perceptual experiences, Wilhelm Schapp centrally argues that we cannot visually perceive certain distant things, like a house seen far down in the valley. My main contention is that, in cases relevantly similar to Schapp’s, we do perceptually experience distant things, viz., as drastically “decayed” things, which are part of distant scenes. In doing so, we adopt towards them a kind of conservative “attitude.” The ideas of decay and scenicness (...) will be unpacked in terms of the Husserlian ideas of fulfilment, and fulfilment conditions, capturing the idea that we perceptually experience objects in terms of anticipated possibilities for further experiences of these objects. These ideas will also be considered in relation to Herbert Leyendecker’s notion of an attitude, e.g., of observing, searching for, or working with objects. (shrink)

Both John Campbell and Quassim Cassam have argued that we perceptually experience objects as mind-independent (MI), purportedly solving a problem they refer to as “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In this paper, I will consider the same topic from a Husserlian perspective. In particular, I will clarify the idea of MI and argue that there is, indeed, a sense in which we can perceptually experience objects as MI, while also making objections to Campbell’s and Cassam’s respective arguments to the same effect. In particular, (...) I will argue that objects can be experienced as MI in the sense of the experience’s not being due to the malfunctioning of a perceptual organ, e.g., when one examines the ways in which the object displays itself, and gains confidence that there is, indeed, nothing the matter with one’s eyes. I will address the issue of MI from the perspective of Husserlian evidentialism, according to which perceptual content is conceived in terms of ways of perceptually exploring the object, thereby gaining evidence pertinent to the object and its properties, e.g., as when one takes a look at the object’s shape from a different angle, or scrutinizes its color in better lighting. (shrink)

Susanna Siegel argues that visual contents are rich: visual experiences represent a variety of properties, over and above mere colors and shapes, including, notably, kind properties, e.g., the property of being a pine tree. To argue her case, she makes use of the method of phenomenal contrasts, which involves choosing among different explanatory hypotheses to account for phenomenal contrasts between relevant experiences. I will argue that there is reason to question whether the method of phenomenal contrasts is suitable for establishing (...) that kind properties are represented in visual experiences, insofar as the method draws upon first-person intuitions eclectically. (shrink)

The concept of flourishing has recently come into vogue within various areas of the humanities and social sciences (e.g. philosophy, psychology, economics, health, education). This article focuses on its potential role within education, where the retrieval of flourishing has perhaps been most visible of all the recent areas of interest, setting in motion what some have called a ‘flourishing bandwagon’. This bandwagon has blazed a trail for the somewhat radical view that flourishing can be seen not only as a significant (...) aim, but even the central aim, of all educational endeavours. Recent criticisms of the flourishing view focus on its potential vacuity and its unhelpful conflation of general and laudable, but uneducable, socio-political and psycho-moral aims with educable ones, hence placing unreasonable burdens on practitioners. After providing a brief historical and conceptual backdrop, this article aims at fleshing out and finessing the scope of education for flourishing and, hence at responding to the recent critics. This is done inter alia through an analogy with health where a similar theoretical problem beckons about possible conceptual underpopulations and overpopulations of the content of the aim of health itself. (shrink)

Ofsted requires UK schools to help students understand the working world and gain employability skills. However, the aims of education are much broader: Education should enable flourishing long after leaving school. Therefore, students’ career decisions should be conducive to long-term flourishing beyond career readiness and educational attainment. In this mixed-methods study, we asked a representative sample of UK adults to reflect on their career decision-making processes at school and at university. We also measured current levels of self-reported objective (e.g., financial (...) security) and subjective (e.g., subjective well-being) flourishing. The open-ended career decision reflections were coded for three moral reasoning strategies: virtue ethical, consequentialist, and deontological. Using correlations and structural equation modelling, we examined the association between the propensity for using each moral reasoning strategy in past career decisions and current flourishing. Virtue ethical moral reasoning in relation to career decision-making predicted aspects of flourishing most strongly and frequently. Consequentialist reasoning weakly and infrequently positively predicted aspects of flourishing. Deontological reasoning either did not predict flourishing at all, or negatively predicted flourishing. Our results suggest that the reasoning strategy behind career decisions people take in school or university is important to consider in UK careers provision, and current best practice. (shrink)

Response to commentaries on keynote article.

This is the long-awaited publication of a set of writings by the British philosopher, historian, and archaeologist R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943) on critical, anthropological, and cultural themes only hinted at in his previously available work. At the core are six essays on folktale and magic in which Collingwood applies the principles of his philosophy of history to problems in the long-term evolution of human society and culture. The volume opens with three substantial introductory essays by the editors, authorities in their various (...) fields, who provide their explanatory and contextual notes to guide the reader through the texts. The Philosophy of Enchantment highlights the broad range of Collingwood's intellectual engagements, their integration, and their relevance to current areas of debate in the fields of philosophy, cultural studies, social and literary history, and anthropology. (shrink)

The paper offers an account of consciousness as a biological process. All its theoretical concepts are derived from the biological context and accurately defined in causal and functional terms. To cover the essence of what is commonly meant by the word ‘consciousness’, and to avoid confusion through a selective or theoretically biased interpretation of that word, the paper addresses the dimensions of awareness which the word denotes according to the dictionaries of the English language, viz., an awareness of the surrounding (...) world, of the self, and of one's thoughts and feelings. These are examined at the primary levels at which they might exist also in nonhuman species. (shrink)

Предназначено для представителей науки и образования, политических партий, общественных и религиозных организаций, органов государственного управления.

The construction of theoretical models in biology, situated at the cross-roads of biology, mathematics and computer science, often leads to a tool as final product. Its genesis can be named Infogenesis. The procedure of the resolution of theoretical problems is analyzed on examples of practical purposes taken from plant biology.The first example deals with mineral plant nutrition, explaining a way to go from theoretical ionic balances to the experimental realization of nutritional solutions with macro-element components.

This paper contains an axiomatic theory of first order modal logic with operations, identity, and descriptions together with a formal semantics which interprets the theory in such a manner that empty universes of discourse and denotationless terms are allowed for at each possible world. The intuitive basis of the theory is discussed in preliminary sections, the syntax and semantics of theory are then characterized, its semantical adequacy is demonstrated, and certain important axioms and theorems are discussed in detail in later (...) sections. (shrink)

SOME years ago Giangrande acutely suggested1 that we should read at the beginning of this line έσтààθη δ’ φθοολλος in place of Buttmann' proposal έσàκη δ’ θολλος accepted by Pfeiffer. Giangrande' emendation received upport from Meillier, who wrote:2 ‘Giangrande … a trouvé de bonnes raisons pour conserver έσтààθη … et propose έσтààθη δ’ φθοολλος.’ No one seems to have realized that there is a metrical difficulty involved in Buttmann' emendation—an ironic fact, as his original intention was, of course, to restore (...) the metre of the line. According to Buttmann' text, the first five feet of the line, in terms of dactyls and spondees, emerge as S S D S D. Callimachus does not seem to use this formation either in the elegiac metre of this hymn or in his Epigrams.3 The figures given by Beneke, based on Schneider' text, need correction in that there is only one example of an S S D S D line in the Epigrams of Callimachus, not two.That such hexameters occur in the Aitia6 is of no consequence. Callimachus clearly regarded the distichs of the Aitia as bound by less strict metrical rules than the distichs of the Epigrams and Hymn 5, as his employment of σπονδєιàζονтєς indicates. From all the above it follows that Giangrande' restoration is the more convincing as it is the first to be metrically acceptable.7. (shrink)

The problem of self-knowledge, originally ethnic, and then national, always excited and continues to worry humanity. At different times, she was sharper, then she calmed down, then stepped forward, then she became one in line with other issues of political, economic and social life. But this problem was inevitable. It was one of the sources of the spirit and activities of the people.

Early work from a leader in analytic philosophy From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, Volume 1: Collected Philosophical Papers is part of a multi-volume publication of G.E.M. Anscombe's collected works. Writing on philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic, Anscombe is known as one of analytical Thomisms's most prominent figures. This collection includes her writing on the work of her teacher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, with whom she worked closely as co-editor and translator.